


# Which is the Bigger Problem?





# Risk =



## Threat x Vulnerability x Consequence



P(Bad event) x P(damage) x Damage

## S. Florida Snow Risk

# The Miami Herald

Massive Blizzard Hits S. Florida!

Threat

Probability of snow = .000,000,000,1

Vulnerability X

Prob Snow causes damage = 1.00000

Consequence

Amount of Damage = \$5,000,000,000

Risk = \$5.00

## S. Florida Hurricane Risk

# The Miami Herald

Massive Hurricane Hits S. Florida!

**Threat** 

Probability of Hurricane = 1

Vulnerability

Prob Hurricane causes damage = .7

Consequence

X

Amount of Damage = \$5,000,000,000

Risk = \$3,500,000,000

# Risk (malicious) =



Threat (Intent x Capability)

x Vulnerability x Consequence

## Mars Attacks!



Vulnerability

Prob they will kill us = 1 X

Consequence

Damage = We all Die X

Intent

They REALLY want to kill us = 1 X

Capability

They can't get here = 0Risk = 0

```
Risk =
```

Malicious Act:

Natural event/ Accident:
P(vector) x P(damage) x Damage

(Intent x Capability) x P(damage) x Damage

# Threat Vectors for GPS

Natural/Accidental	Malicious Acts
1. Built structure obstruction	12. Privacy seeker (1 event)
2. Terrain obstruction	13. Criminal Jamming (1 event)
3. Foliage (pines, hvy canopy)	14. Criminal + Privacy 1 Yr Total
4. Solar Activity – mild	15. Criminal Spoofing (1 event)
5. Solar Activity - moderate	16. Terrorist Jamming
6. Solar Activity -powerful	17. Terrorist Spoofing
7. Human Error/software	18. Military-style Jamming
8. Satellite malfunction	19. Nat. Agent Spoofing
9. Control Segment Failure	20. Attack on Satellites
10. Space Debris	21. Attack on Control Segment
11. Unintentional RF	22. Cyber Attack on Control Segment

Vector Assessment Criteria					
Vulnerability					
1	Low Vector able to impact less than 5% of users				
2	Moderate	Difficult for this vector to impact overall GPS service, or more than 10% of users			
3	Significant Fairly easy for this vector to impact many unsophisticated users and high performance us				
		Fairly easy for this vector to impact all or most users			
5	0 , , ,				
Conseque	nce				
1	Low	No noticeable economic losses, unlikely impact to safety of life			
2	Moderate	Probable economic losses, possible safety of life impacts			
3	Significant Documented economic losses, probable safety of life impacts				
4	High	Economic losses > \$1B, injuries, probable loss of life			
5	5 Severe Economic losses > \$5B, and/or loss of life				
		mena & Accident = Probability of Occurrence			
1	Low	Probability/history of occurrence < once every 100 years			
2	Moderate	Probability/history of occurrence ≥ once every 100 years			
3 Significant Probability/history of occurrence ≥ once every 50 years		<i>" " " "</i>			
4	High	Probability/history of occurrence > once every 10 years			
5 Severe Probability/history of occurrence ≥ once every year					
Inreat of	vialicious Acts	= Bad actor intent x Bad actor capability			
Intent					
1	Low	No expressed desire or interest			
2	Moderate	Rarely expressed desire or interest			
3	Significant Repeat expressions of interest, some attempts, possible successes				
4	High	Repeat expressions of interest, some attempts, some successes			
5					
Capability					
1	Low	No known ability to access and use this method			
2	·				
		organizations)			
3	Significant	Available to <u>all</u> nations & sophisticated actors			
4	High	Available to moderately sophisticated actors (individual technologists, criminals, etc.)			
5	Severe	Available to unsophisticated actors (low cost, easy to access or build and use)			

### **Example:**

5. Solar Activity – Moderate

Risk Score = 24

### **Vulnerability** - 3

The great preponderance of GPS receivers in use across applications are relatively unsophisticated and subject to disruption by moderate solar activity. Moderate events are of limited duration and only some users were exposed and impacted.

**Significant** – Fairly easy for this vector to impact many unsophisticated and high performance users

### Consequence - 2

Events in Sept 2005, Dec 2006, Sept 2014 were well documented, but none resulted in resulted in reports of significant economic damage or impact to safety of life. This may change as use of GPS equipment and signals continues to increase and broaden, but there is no documented history of significant impacts.

Moderate - Probable economic losses, possible safety of life impacts

#### Threat – 4

There have been three events in the last 11 years.

**High** – Probability/history  $\geq$  once every 10 years

## Total Risk to GPS Services & US National and Economic Security

n		

				Threat		
	Vector	Vulnerability	Consequence	Intent	Capability	Risk Score
	1. Built structure obstruction	1	2	5		10
	2. Terrain obstruction	1	2	5		10
ı	3. Foliage (pines, hvy canopy)	1	1	5		5
ccidental	4. Solar Activity – mild	1	1	5		5
Acc	5. Solar Activity - moderate	3	2	4		24
≓	6. Solar Activity -powerful	5	5	2		50
∞	7. Human Error/software	5	1 5	3		15-75
Natural	8. Satellite malfunction	1	1	4		4
lat	9. Control Segment Failure	5	5	1		25
=	10. Space Debris	1	4	2		8
	11. Unintentional RF	5	1 4	5		25 - 100
	12. Privacy seeker (1 event)	5	3	√5	√5	75
	13. Criminal Jamming (1 event)	5	3	√5	√5	75
	14. Criminal + Privacy 1 Yr Total	5	5	√5	√5	125
	15. Criminal Spoofing (1 event)	4	3	√4	√4	48
Malicious	16. Terrorist Jamming	5	5	√5	√5	125
i i	17. Terrorist Spoofing	4	4	√3	√4	55
₽	18. Military-style Jamming	5	5	√5	√5	125
∣≡	19. Nat. Agent Spoofing	3	4	√4	√4	48
	20. Attack on Satellites	5	5	√1	√1	25
	21. Attack on Control Segment	1	1	<b>√1</b>	√2	1.4
	22. Cyber Attack Control Segment	2	5	√3	√2	24

Table 2 - Vectors by Risk Score				
14. Criminal + Privacy 1 <u>Yr</u> Total	125			
16. Terrorist Jamming	125			
18. Military-style Jamming	125			
11. Unintentional RF	25 - 100			
7. Human Error/software	15 - 75			
13. Criminal Jamming (1 event)	75			
12. Privacy seeker (1 event)	75			
17. Terrorist Spoofing	55			
6. Solar Activity - powerful	50			
19. Nat. Agent Spoofing	48			
15. Criminal Spoofing (1 event)	48			
20. Attack on Satellites	25			
9. Control Segment Failure	25			
22. Cyber Attack Control Segment	24			
5. Solar Activity - moderate	24			
2. Terrain obstruction	10			
1. Built structure obstruction	10			
10. Space Debris	8			
3. Foliage (pines, hvy canopy)	5			
4. Solar Activity – mild	5			
8. Satellite malfunction	4			
21. Attack on Control Segment	1.4			
Colors added to show natural groupings				





#### PRIORITIZING DANGERS TO THE UNITED STATES FROM THREATS TO GPS

Ranking Risks and Proposed Mitigations

#### WHITE PAPER

This paper examines risks to the United States, its Global Positioning System (GPS) and GPS signals. Other Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) have very similar characteristics as GPS. This high-level risk model may be of use when considering risks to other nations and to GNSS more generally.




Paper available at www.RNTFnd.org/Library

The Resilient Navigation and Timing Foundation is a 501(c)3 educational and scientific charity registered in Virginia.

This paper is available on line at www.rntfnd.org/Library



### Result 2: GNSS Denial Events






**European Commission Project** 

### STRIKE3

### Result 3: Durations of interference events

#### ALL events (450,363 events)




Most events are very short durations 12% of ALL events are greater than 60 seconds

### Some findings:

- 7191 events > 5 minutes
- 1112 events > 30 minutes
- 610 events > 60 minutes
- 5 events > 1 day
- Longest event = 5 days

### High Priority events (73,723 events)



34% priority events are greater than 60 seconds







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