

Robust and Resilient PNT: Today's Requirement

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Argo	Maxtran	Miniranger	RESEARCH & GENERAL LIGHTHOUSE AUTHORITIES United Kingdom and Ireland
Omega	Hydrotrac		
	Syledis	Decca	Geoloc
GPS	Pulse 8	Raydist N	Loran Hyperfix
Spot	Transit		Artemis
Lorac MicroFix	Raydist	Trident DRS Trisponde	Toran




Source: www.apple.com

GPS is vulnerable at system, signal and user levels



		Vulnerability Examples	Possible Mitigation
	n	Satellite clock failures (e.g. SVN23, 1 Jan 2004)	Second system or augmentation (e.g. Galileo, eLoran, SBAS)
	System	Poor signal quality (e.g. evil waveforms)	Second system or augmentation (e.g. Galileo, eLoran, SBAS)
		Design flaws (e.g. Block IIR ranging code interruptions)	Second system or augmentation (e.g. Galileo, eLoran, SBAS)
	Signal	Intentional interference (e.g. potential terrorism)	Second dissimilar system (e.g. eLoran)
		Unintentional interference (e.g. Moss Landing)	Second system, other GNSS frequencies (e.g. e-Loran, L2C, L5)
		lonospheric effects (e.g. scintillation at high latitudes or equator)	Second dissimilar system (e.g. e-Loran)
	User	Equipment malfunction (e.g. Royal Majesty, 1995)	Second dissimilar system (e.g. eLoran)
		Signal occultation (e.g. Urban canyons)	More SVs &/or second dissimilar system (e.g.Galileo, SBAS, eLoran)
		Local Interference (e.g. Manatoulin TV set)	Improved siting &/or second dissimilar system






5754GHz

100MHz Spans






The Demand








Trinity House moved UB38 in June 2008






LT Cortesia Grounding, 2 January 2008











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